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1. Introduction
Since the middle of the 1990s, Japan has been witnessing the rampancy of right-wing forces. 
This rightward tilt is seen across Japanese society, in education, culture and politics, as manifested 
respectively in the activation of Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, the best-selling War 
Theory by cartoonist Yoshinori Kobayashi, and the establishment of Shinzō Abe and Tarō Asō cabinets 
that emphasized “conservatism.”
In this tilt, Japanese historical revisionists have contrasted themselves with what they term the 
“Tokyo Trial view of history” and the “masochistic view of history.” These revisionists regard as “mas-
ochistic” any characterization of Japan’s military advances in Asia during the pre-World War II period 
as an “invasion.” And they claim a “spell” lingering from the Tokyo Tribunal of War Criminals underlies 
this “masochistic view of history.” Arguing that the Tokyo Tribunal created and developed a false per-
ception of the Greater East Asia War as “the war in which the liberal Allies defeated a fascist Japan,” the 
revisionists stress that denouncing and denying the tribunal is the key to shaking off this “masochistic 
view of history.”
In their discourse on the denial of the tribunal, revisionists frequently invoke the so-called “Pal’s 
Judgment.” An Indian judge participating in the Tokyo Tribunal, Radhabinod Pal, issued a dissentient 
opinion paper titled Dissentient Judgment of Justice Pal, and asserted that all Japanese Class-A defen-
dants at the trials were criminally innocent. Since the tribunal’s language department omitted the word 
“dissentient,” the paper became widely known in Japan as “Pal’s Judgment.”
However, the Judgment is often presented without a thorough examination of its content. In-
stead, only the decontextualized conclusion—that the Japanese suspects are not guilty—is singled out. 
In 2007, the author of this paper published Judge Pal: Criticism of the Tokyo Trial and Absolute Pacifi sm 
[Hakusui-sha, Tokyo] in order to draw attention to misreadings of “Pal’s Judgment.” While the book was 
well received, it also became a target of historical revisionists, such as Yoshinori Kobayashi, and was 
subjected to their severe bashing.
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Based on the author’s book, the object of this paper is to analyze the bones of Pal’s theory in his 
judgment and to examine the philosophy behind it. The author also introduces an overview on how Pal’s 
Judgment fi rst became misinterpreted by Japanese historical revisionists, in order to explain how current 
revisionist discourse on the judgment was shaped. 
2. Theory of Pal’s Judgment
Based on the principle of non-retroactivity of law, Judge Pal, fi rst of all, explicated his criticism 
of the tribunal’s ex post facto legislation in his dissentient opinion. He affi rmed that the alleged “con-
ventional war crimes” by the Japanese defendants came within the jurisdiction of the tribunal because 
they were already classifi ed as crimes in pre-existing international law. However, Pal opposed “crimes 
against peace,” and “crimes against humanity” defi ned in the tribunal charter because these crimes had 
no previous grounds in international law. If the defendants would be found guilty of the crimes not 
existing in international law when the alleged acts were actually executed, Pal said, then “the tribunal 
will not be a ‘judicial tribunal’ but a mere tool for the manifestation of power.”1 He argued the differ-
ence between judiciary and politics, and severely criticized the control of the trial by statesmen’ political 
intentions.
Pal objected to the introduction of an ex post facto law at the tribunal because he believed that 
by ruling on ex post facto law, international society would not be bound by a common understanding 
against wars, instead it would subscribe to an understanding that the victors of wars were entitled to 
judge the defeated while disregarding the rules of international law. Thus, he argued that if the Tokyo 
Tribunal invoked an ex post facto law it would eventually foment the expansion of wars of aggression 
and a breakdown of the foundation of international order, rather than lead toward the eradication of 
wars. He stressed the importance of genuine legal processes and the establishment of the rule of law as 
follows:
Such a trial [a tribunal with an ex post facto legislation] may justly create the feeling that the set-
ting up of a tribunal like the present is much more a political than a legal affair; an essentially po-
litical objective having thus been cloaked by a juridical appearance. Formalized vengeance can 
bring only an ephemeral satisfaction, with every probability of ultimate regret; but vindication 
of law through genuine legal process alone may contribute substantially to the re-establishment 
of order and decency in international relations.2
He questioned the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (CIMTFE), 
which was promulgated on January 19, 1945 and defi ned the setup of the tribunal. In adding to “con-
1　The Research Committee on Tokyo Trial 1984a, p. 268.
2　Ibid., pp. 268–269.
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ventional war crimes,” the charter upheld new crimes that did not have a foundation in pre-existing 
international law: “crimes against peace” and “crimes against humanity.” Pal denounced this sort of 
charter largely as a transgression on the fundamental rules of international law. He said an international 
court, irregardless of who set it up or manned it, “does not defi ne the crime but only specifi es the acts the 
authors whereof are placed under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”3 He explained that the charter ought 
to merely decide what matters would come up for trial before the tribunal and whether or not these acts 
constituted any crime was left open for determination by the tribunal with reference to the appropriate 
law. From this point of view, he strongly condemned the charter of the Tokyo Tribunal as widely dero-
gating from the fundamental rule of jurisdiction.
According to Pal, the victors had the right to set up a special court, and therefore the establish-
ment of a charter itself was not problematic; however the civilized world did not recognize the victors’ 
right to legislate the creation of new crimes in international law.
He also said that judges of the tribunal were “competent to investigate the question of whether 
any provisions of the charter is or is not ultra vires”4 in the refl ection of international law, because the 
charter of the tribunal itself derives its authority from international law.
As a judge of the tribunal, Pal concluded that the “crimes against peace” and the “crimes against 
humanity” were seen as an ex post facto law and invalid to the non-retroactivity law in international 
law. Further, Pal examined the historical process on the “overall conspiracy” which was explained by 
the prosecution as a premise of the alleged “crimes against peace,” and criticized the prosecutors’ argu-
ments. He intended to prove that so-called “crimes against peace” were invalid both from jurisprudence 
and historical views.
Pal, however, did not deny the whole tribunal. He affi rmed and supported the value of examining 
the alleged acts for “conventional war crimes” that would come to the court. “A war,” he said, “whether 
legal or illegal, whether aggressive or defensive, is still a war to be regulated by the accepted rules of 
warfare. No pact, no convention has in any way abrogated jus-in-bello.”5
Pal’s viewpoint on the Tokyo Tribunal was refl ected in how he structured his dissentient opinion 
paper. “Pal’s Judgment” consists of seven chapters: Part I Preliminary Question of Law; Part II The 
Defi nition of Aggressive War; Part III Rules of Evidence and Procedure; Part IV Overall Conspiracy; 
Part V Scope of Tribunal’s Jurisdiction; Part VI War Crimes Stricto Sensu and Part VII Recommenda-
tion. An important point to note here is that he placed “Scope of Tribunal’s Jurisdiction” after the chapter 
about the alleged “overall conspiracy.” In Part IV, which occupies the largest volume in the paper, he 
explained that the “overall conspiracy,” that was given as a premise of “crimes against humanity” by the 
prosecution, was not established as a crime in international law, therefore, the indictments themselves 
3　Ibid., pp. 278–279.
4　Ibid., pp. 300–301.
5　Ibid., p. 244.
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were invalid before the judgment on the question of innocence or guilt.
The only alleged acts by the Japanese defendants he saw triable by the tribunal from a genuine 
judicial point of view were “conventional war crimes,” because these crimes were defi ned in pre-exist-
ing international law at the time the alleged acts were carried out. Whether the accused were guilty or 
not would be open to the court, so he found no confl ict in hearing the alleged acts at the tribunal. This 
was the reason Pal clarifi ed the scope of the tribunal before the section on “conventional war crimes,” 
and defi ned the scope as after the Sino-Japanese War.
In Part VI, “War Crimes Stricto Sensu,” he examined the establishment of criminality in what 
he called the “atrocities” conducted by the Japanese Imperial Army. Regarding the Nanjing Massacre, 
although he premised that wartime propaganda from hostile sources was blended in with the evidence 
submitted to the court, and therefore it may not be safe to accept the entire story, he concluded that the 
fact that the “atrocities” were executed by the Imperial Army was unshakable. He said as follows:
Keeping in view everything that can be said against the evidence adduced in this case in this 
respect and making every possible allowance for propaganda and exaggeration, the evidence is 
still overwhelming that atrocities were perpetrated by members of the Japanese armed forces 
against the civilian population of some of the territories occupied by them, and also against 
prisoners of war.6
Whatever that be, as I have already observed, even making allowance for everything that can be 
said against the evidence, there is no doubt that the conduct of the Japanese soldiers at Nanking [Pal’s 
spelling] was atrocious and that such atrocities were intense for nearly three weeks and continued to be 
serious for a total of six weeks as was testifi ed to by Dr. Bates.7
Pal then continued to investigate whether the facts supporting the accusation that the Class-A 
War Crime-accused defendants ordered, authorized and permitted others to commit those acts, and such 
persons actually committed them; and if the facts supported that the Class-A accused committed foul 
acts, in other words, that they deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal duty to take adequate 
steps to prevent the commission of such criminal acts.
On the fi rst point, while saying that the alleged atrocities were characterized as “devilish and 
fi endish,” he concluded that no evidence of any alleged order, authorization or permission was found. 
He judged that the atrocities including the Nanjing Massacre were determined and executed by the Army 
soldiers on the ground, and the people who were responsible for the acts had already been executed as 
Class B and C war criminals.
It should be remembered that in the majority of cases “stern justice” has already been meted out 
6　The Research Committee on Tokyo Trial 1984b, p. 556.
7　Ibid., p. 600.
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by the victor nations to the persons charged with having actually perpetrated those atrocious acts along 
with their immediate superiors. We have been given by the prosecution long lists of such convicts.8
But those who might have committed these terrible brutalities are not before us now. Those of 
them who could be got hold of alive have been made to answer for their misdeeds mostly with their 
lives.9
On the issue of foul acts, for which the defendants would be found guilty if it were proven that 
the atrocities by Japan became intense and were carried out on a larger scale due to the defendants’ “in-
tention” or “negligence,” Pal said, “these commanders [the Japanese defendants] were legally bound to 
maintain discipline in the army and to restrain the soldiers under their command from perpetrating these 
atrocities,” and continued as follows:
It is true that a commanding offi cer is not liable for the acts of those in his command merely 
because he is their superior offi cer; but, because of his great control over them, he should be 
responsible for such acts of theirs which he could reasonably have prevented. He had the duty to 
take such appropriate measures as were in his power to control the troops under his command.10
However, Pal concluded that the evidence submitted to the court was not suffi cient to prove the 
alleged cases of acts or the accused as criminally responsible for the cases.
It is a fact that Pal strongly condemned the atrocities by the Japanese Imperial Army including 
the Nanjing Massacre as determined by facts. However, he concluded that the Japanese A-Class sus-
pects’ criminal responsibility for the atrocities could not be proven due to a lack of evidence.
Pal next took up Japan’s “maltreatment of prisoners of war.” In examining the alleged offences, 
he spent many pages on the cases of the Bataan Death March in the Philippines and the construction of 
the Burma-Thai Railway. He strongly denounced both cases and acts committed by the Army.
Regarding the Bataan Death March, he said it was “really an atrocious brutality” and “I do not 
think that the occurrence was at all justifi able.”11 Regarding the employment of prisoners of war for the 
Burma-Thai Railway construction, which directly related to the Japanese war operation, he said this was 
“inhuman,” and that the accused Hideki Tōjō, Japan’s Prime Minister from October 1941 to July 1944 
was fully responsible.
He continued, though, by saying that the March was “an isolated instance of cruelty”12 and the 
railway construction was a “mere acts of states,”13 and eventually concluded that the evidence did not 
8　Ibid., p. 566.
9　Ibid., p. 590.
10　Ibid., p. 613.
11　Ibid., pp. 671–672.
12　Ibid., p. 672.
13　Ibid..
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satisfy him that the alleged acts were conducted under the order, authorization, or with foul acts by the 
accused. In other words, he concluded that the accused could not be found criminally liable due to the 
lack of evidence.
A point that should be noted is the difference in his argumentations for “crimes against peace” 
and “conventional war crimes.” Regarding “crimes against peace,” he presented his view that the 
crimes’ nature was an ex post facto law fi rst and foremost. Additionally, the “overall conspiracy” which 
the prosecution tried to establish as a premise for “crimes against peace” was not found. Therefore, the 
indictment for “crimes against peace” itself was fundamentally not established. On the other hand, in the 
matter of the alleged offenses of “conventional war crimes,” wherein Pal approved the grounds in inter-
national law and approved of hearing by the tribunal, Pal investigated the alleged crimes in accordance 
with international law and eventually concluded that the evidence at court was not suffi cient to establish 
the criminal responsibility of the defendants for the accused acts.
3. Pal’s View on History and His Opinion on Legislation
In Part IV of his dissentient judgment, Pal examined the alleged “overall conspiracy.” The prose-
cution claimed that the defendants had conspired, and that the accused crimes were part of Japan’s over-
all plot to occupy Manchuria, the whole of China and eventually the entire world. While he criticized 
Japan’s acts allegedly executed under the “overall conspiracy,” including the Chang Tso-lin Assassina-
tion Incident and Manchurian Incident in Japan’s steps toward the Sino-Japanese War, Pal pointed out 
that Japan was an imitator of Western Imperialism and argued that both Japan and the Allied countries 
were morally responsible for their actions.
Firstly, he took up the Chang Tso-lin Assassination Incident by the Japanese Kwantung Army, 
on June 4, 1928. The incident was plotted by Kwantung Amy offi cer Colonel Daisaku Komoto, and the 
leader of Fengtian Army warlord Chang was killed. Kawamoto had planned to conquer Manchuria by 
taking advantage of the confusion that would have occurred after the incident. However, this failed as 
the chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army were not informed of his plan, and the Fengtian Army did not 
respond to this provocation. In the Tokyo Tribunal, the prosecution claimed that the incident was the 
fi rst act in the defendants’ “overall conspiracy” in which they consistently and carefully planned and 
prepared acts or wars of aggression such as the Manchuria Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, up to and 
including the Greater East Asia War.
Pal disagreed with their claim. He said, “Chang Tso-lin’s murder was planned and executed by 
a certain group of Kwantung army offi cers. There is absolutely nothing to connect this plan or plot with 
the alleged conspiracy.”
He continued, “Planning any murder and executing the same are certainly reprehensible by 
themselves. But we are not now trying any of the accused for that dastardly act of murder. We are to see 
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what connection this story has with any relevant issue before us.”14
He described the Chang Tso-lin Assassination Incident as a “dastardly act of murder,” and said 
Kawamoto and others who were involved in it were “reprehensible,” However, from the legal point of 
view, he stressed the necessity of proof to show the “dastardly act” by the Army offi cers was a part of 
the “overall conspiracy” by the accused Japanese leaders. After examining the evidence, he came to 
the conclusion that although it was true that many offi cers in the Kwantung Army “intended to occupy 
Manchuria” at that time, the Incident was planned and executed by a limited group of people and the 
evidence given in the court failed to establish that there was an “overall conspiracy” behind the incident. 
He said the alleged “crimes against peace” could not be established simply by connecting irrelevant 
cases to “the whole story.”
What should be confi rmed here is that although he argued the incident was not a part of “con-
spiracy,” he did not give his approval to the incident itself.
He next addressed the Manchurian Incident. He fi rst discussed the Mukden Incident [or the 
Liutiaogou Incident] which occurred at the outset of the Manchurian Incident, and argued that it was 
diffi cult to determine from the evidence that the Mukden Incident was a conspiracy among the Japanese 
defendants. He said:
Even accepting the evidence of Tanaka and Okada that the Mukden Incident of 18 September, 
1931, was planned by some young offi cers of the Kwantung Army, I do not fi nd any substantial 
evidence to connect any of the accused with that clique. The position in my opinion still remains 
as was found by the Lytton Commission. The incident might have been the result of a design 
on the part of some unknown army offi cers, yet those who acted on the strength of the incident 
might have acted quite bona fi de.15
The gist of his logic here is same as with the Chang Tso-lin Assassination Incident—Although 
the Mukden Incident might have been a plot by particular offi cers of Kwantung Army, the connection 
between them and the accused leaders was not clear, as a consequence it was diffi cult to view the inci-
dent was a part of an alleged “overall conspiracy.”
Again this does not mean Pal was uncritical regarding the incident or the Kwantung Army. 
“The military developments in Manchuria after September 18, 1931, were certainly reprehensible. De-
spite the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet that the operation must cease immediately, the expansion 
continued.”16
He determined the Manchurian Incident was “reprehensible” and saw the actions of the Army 
14　The Research Committee on Tokyo Trial 1984a, pp. 700–701.
15　Ibid., pp. 749–750.
16　Ibid., p. 793.
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ignoring the Japanese Cabinet order and initiating the incident as a problem. Still, he kept his opinion 
that the circumstances did not prove a conspiracy among those accused. “No one would applaud such a 
policy. No one would perhaps justify such a policy. Yet this need not drive us to a theory of conspiracy,” 
said Pal.17
In this Chapter, he further discussed the Western powers’ political and military acts in the in-
ternational community at that time. While presenting the view that the Kwantung Army and the West-
ern countries were companions in crime, he condemned the Western powers for launching accusations 
against Japan while ignoring their own responsibility for committing acts that were similar to those of 
the Japanese Army.
First, he criticized Japan’s establishment of Manchukuo, calling it an “elaborate political farce,” 
forced upon the Chinese people by Japan’s military occupation of Manchuria.
The power to play the farce of ‘Manchukuo’ on the Manchurian stage, as well as the power to 
seize control over Manchuria had been acquired by the Japanese manu military. As has been observed in 
the Review of International Affairs, the military conquest and occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese 
Army was the real foundation of the Japanese position in Manchuria in 1932; and the whole world was 
aware that this was the fact. The Japanese were apparently prepared to defy the world’s opinion and to 
risk the consequences of the world’s disapproval in order to keep their ill-gotten gains.18
Then, however, he asked why Japan did not simply proclaim the annexation of Manchuria in-
stead of persisting in a farce. Pal saw the answer in the process of Japan’s modernization itself, which 
was a continuous imitation of the West. “It is considered probable that it might be attributed in part to 
an anxiety to imitate Western behavior—an anxiety had become an idée fi xe in Japanese minds since the 
beginning of the Meiji era,”19 he said.
Pal then critically examined Western Imperialism, which, he asserted, Japan had imitated. Quot-
ing the International Affairs by the International Affairs Research Center in Britain, he turned the target 
of the criticism toward the colonial policies of Western powers.
Was it not Western Imperialism that had coined the word ‘protectorate’ as a euphemism for 
‘annexation’? And had not this constitutional fi ction served its Western inventors in good stead? Was 
not this the method by which the Government of the French Republic had stepped into the shoes of the 
Sultan of Morocco, and by which the British Crown had transferred the possession of vast tracts of land 
in East Africa from native African to adventitious European hands?
For Pal, Japan’s “farce” was nothing but the result of imitating Western fashions of imperial-
ism. From this point of view, he questioned why only Japan’s establishment of Manchukuo could be 
assessed as an “aggression.” Weren’t Western countries morally guilty as well in practicing colonialism? 
17　Ibid., 1984a, p. 803.
18　Ibid., p. 805.
19　Ibid., p. 806.
26Takeshi Nakajima.indd   260 2011/02/23   16:49:27
The Radhabinod Pal Dissentient Judgment and Nationalism in Post-War Japan
261
If the acts of aggression by Western countries were not charged as crimes, why was the establishment 
of Manchukuo by Japan?20
Pal said:
Though the Japanese failed to make the most of these Western precedents in stating their case 
for performing the farce of ‘Manchukuo,’ it may legitimately be conjectured that Western as well 
as Japanese precedents had in fact suggested, and commended, this line of policy to Japanese 
minds.21
By saying, “it may not be a justifi able policy, justifying one nation’s expansion in another’s 
territory,” he emphasized that both Japan and the Western countries were morally responsible for the 
colonization of other nations. Pal explained that Japan was at that time possessed with a “delusion” 
and believed that the country would face death and destruction if it failed in acquiring Manchuria. Pal 
regarded this as the reason for Japan’s attempts to establish interests which it saw as necessary for its 
very existence. Pal said that carrying out a military operation driven by “delusion” was not unique to 
Japan as it had been repeatedly practiced on a large scale by Western countries for many years. Saying, 
“Almost every great power acquired similar interests within the territories of the Eastern Hemisphere 
and, it seems, every such power considered that interest to be very vital,”22 Pal argued that Japan had the 
“right” to argue that the Manchuria Incident was necessary for the sake of “self defense.” Japan claim-
ing national “self-defense” in regard to its territorial expansion in China was in step with international 
society at the time, Pal said, and thus Japan’s actions stemmed from the “imitation” of an evil practice of 
Western imperialism. Based on this premise, he concluded, “The actions of Japan in Manchuria would 
not, it is certain, be applauded by the world. At the same time it would be diffi cult to condemn the same 
as criminal.”23
The important thing to notice here is that Pal did not mean to indicate that he saw Japan’s ac-
tions as justifi able. As early mentioned, he criticized the Manchurian Incident as “reprehensible,” and 
the establishment of Manchukuo as an “elaborate political farce” based on “delusion.” But at the court 
Pal strove to show his disapproval of the prosecution’s intention to treat Japan’s actions as if they were 
carried out under an alleged “overall conspiracy,” by presenting the complexity in the reasons why Japan 
pushed herself forward to the occupation of Manchuria.
From his historical point of view, Pal saw the fundamental cause for Japan’s acts of aggression as 
rooted in colonialism by Western countries. He questioned whether the visit by the US Navy’s Commo-
dore Matthew Perry and the conclusion of unequal treaties with Western powers such as United States 
20　Ibid..
21　Ibid., p. 807.
22　Ibid., pp. 858–859.
23　Ibid., p. 761.
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of America, Russia, Great Britain, France and Holland in the late Edo Era was a fundamental cause for 
Japan’s imperialism, and he argued that Japan’s steps toward imperialism were not “blameworthy.”
Pal said:
Then follows Japan’s struggle for getting revision of their treaties. This struggle continued till 
the year 1894. During this period, Japan made every effort to master the great contributions of 
Western thought and science. Perhaps Japan also realized that in the world in which she had been 
thus forced to appear, right and justice were measured in terms of battleships and army corps. 
The Japanese efforts to get these treaties revised were certainly not blameworthy.24
He argued that Japan endeavored toward rapid modernization and Western methods and thoughts 
in order to address the revision of unequal treaties with the Western powers. Japan also built up its mili-
tary power during the process by “imitating” the Western power’s imperialism. While Pal did regard the 
manner in which Japan proceeded with its modernization as problematic, he also questioned whether the 
Western powers could really condemn Japan’s imitating them if the purpose in doing so was revising the 
unequal treaties. “We cannot ignore the possible effects upon Japan of this long struggle for the revision 
of such treaties,”25 said Pal.
This observation can be seen in Pal’s argument on the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. 
He saw these as a part of a power struggle among superpowers instead of unilateral “aggressions” by Ja-
pan. For Pal, it was hypocritical for the Western countries to one-sidedly criticize Japan’s actions, which 
were merely an “imitation” of their own, as a crime. “After the Russo-Japanese war, Japan seemed 
to follow closely the precedents set by Europe in its dealings with China,”26 said Pal in reference to 
Japan’s steps toward expansion of colonial territories after the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese 
Wars. He said that if Japan’s manner of colonialism was seen as problematic, then all colonialism by the 
Western powers ought to be similarly regarded. However, he pointed out, Western powers did not criti-
cize Japan’s actions as “aggression” while the acts were ongoing. He said, “Great Britain renewed and 
strengthened the Anglo-Japanese Alliance at that time and the contemporary powers did not condemn 
Japan’s action as aggressive.”27
Following World War I, Japan, as a faithful ally, rendered valuable assistance in an hour of 
serious and very critical need to the Allied Powers during the First World War. The Allied Powers were 
helped by support from Japan. His question was how these Western countries could blame the steps 
taken by Japan.
Pal presented the following view of history:
24　The Research Committee on Tokyo Trial 1984b, p. 230.
25　Ibid., p. 231.
26　Ibid., p. 249.
27　Ibid., p. 261.
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Japan was a country without any material resources of her own. She started on her career when 
“Western society had come to embrace all the habitable lands and navigable seas on the face 
of the planet and the entire living generation of mankind.” The Japanese emulated the Western 
powers in this respect but unfortunately they began at a time when neither of the two essential 
assets, “a freehand” for their ability and a world-wide fi eld was any longer available to them. 
The responsibility for what Japan was thinking and doing during the period under our consid-
eration really lies with those earlier elder statesmen of Japan who had launched her upon the 
stream of Westernization and had done so, at a moment when the stream was sweeping towards 
a goal which was a mystery even to the people of the West themselves.28
Looking back at the path of Japanese modernization, Pal cast sharp criticism and a caustic view 
on the Western countries. By presenting this sort of paradoxical irony, he intended to criticize Western 
colonialism and to assert that the Western countries and Japan were in cahoots.
Regarding the start of the war between Japan and the United States, Pal blamed the direction of 
diplomatic policy in the United States more than the Japanese. In his view, the United States’ diplomacy 
as represented especially in the Hull Note, eventually cornered Japan. He said, “The evidence [submit-
ted to the court] convinces me that Japan tried her utmost to avoid any clash with America, but was 
driven by the circumstances that gradually developed into the fatal steps taken by her.”29
In his dissentient judgment, Pal repeatedly quoted International Affairs by British Research Cen-
ter for International Affairs, the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, and professor of international law 
at the University of London Georg Schwarzenberger. He tried to break the one-side accusations by the 
prosecution against Japan by highlighting that even some in the Western world had accused the Western 
superpowers.
Regarding the Hull Note in his dissentient judgment, Pal quoted Memoirs of a Superfl uous Man 
by Albert Jay Nock, published in 1943, as follows:
Even contemporary historians could think that ‘as for the present war, the Principality of Mo-
naco, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, would have taken up arms against the United States on 
receipt of such a note [Hull Note] as the State Department sent the Japanese Government on the 
eve of Pearl Harbor.’30
While condemning the move of the United States, Pal also argued on Japan’s problematic di-
plomacy:
28　Ibid., p. 348–349.
29　Ibid., p. 461.
30　Ibid., p. 441.
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There I pointed out why I could not accept the prosecution charge of treacherous conduct of 
the Japanese statesmen concerned. No doubt preparation for war was going on while the dip-
lomatic negotiations were being held. But such preparations were being made by both sides. If 
the Japanese side “had little confi dence that the Kurusu-Nomura negotiations would achieve 
their purposes,” I do not feel that the American side entertained any greater confi dence in the 
diplomatic achievement.31 
Japan prepared for war against the United States while diplomatic talks between the two coun-
tries were ongoing. Pal claimed this “treacherous design” on the part of Japan was a serious matter. But 
he pointed out a similar “treacherous design” was also seen on the U.S. side, therefore both Japan and 
the United States were equally responsible for the war. Regarding the prosecution’s accusations of a 
conspiracy, he argued that neither plan nor conspiracy existed behind the start of the war. He regarded 
Japan’s decision to make war against the United States as not made in advance as a part of the al-
leged “overall conspiracy,” but rather made only during Japan’s diplomatic negotiations with the United 
States, after which it merely executed the decision.
In summarizing Part IV, Pal said, “The statesmen, diplomats and politicians of Japan were 
perhaps wrong, and perhaps they misled themselves. But they were not conspirators. They did not 
conspire.”32
Pal described Japan’s actions following the Chang Tso-lin Assassination Incident as “not justifi -
able,” and applied this assessment to Western colonialism as well. However, on the matter of an alleged 
“overall conspiracy,” he argued that each “isolated” act by Japan had been purposefully framed by the 
prosecution to assert an “overall conspiracy,” as if Japan had managed the acts as part of a policy of 
aggression.
Also, Pal stressed that Japan should not been seen in the same way as Nazi Germany. According 
to his view, Tōjō and his group “might have done many wrong things; but, so far as the public of Japan is 
concerned, certainly by their behavior toward them, they did not succeed in reducing them to a position 
of terror-stricken tools without any free thinking or free expression. The population of Japan was not 
enslaved as in Hitler’s Germany.”33 He claimed that Japan did not have a dictator such as Hitler. During 
the indictment period of the tribunal, he said, “it was not a moment in the life of Japan when power was 
considered to be of any consequence to any individual or group of individuals.”34 The wars in the mod-
ern era were not “the result of any design by any particular individual or group of individuals,”35 said 
Pal. He explained that the “evil of warfare” was transformed by a combination of factors.
31　Ibid., p. 533.
32　Ibid..
33　Ibid., pp. 471–473.
34　Ibid., p. 100.
35　Ibid., p. 179.
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As mentioned earlier, Pal criticized Japanese statesmen, diplomats and politicians with value 
judgment terms such as “mistake,” “wrong,” or “wrong things.” Still he argued that as long as the 
claimed “overall conspiracy” was not established from the evidence at the court, the alleged acts in the 
indictment could not be found criminal. His argument was never “Japan was innocent” or “affi rming 
the Great East War.” Moreover, what should be noted here is that if he absolved the suspects’ criminal 
responsibility he did not dismiss the moral responsibility of Japan. He strongly criticized Japan’s war 
crimes and analyzed Japan’s historical process after the Manchuria Incident as critically as he did the 
colonization of Western countries. Therefore it is obvious that the logic of right-wingers to infer “Ja-
pan’s innocence” or “an affi rmation of the Greater East Asia War” from Pal’s dissentient judgment is an 
obvious misreading as well as a tremendous jump in logic.
The author will examine Pal’s thoughts in the following part.
4. Pal’s Thoughts
In his dissentient judgment, Pal repeatedly expressed the importance of and hope for the estab-
lishment of a system of “international cooperation.”
He said:
I doubt not that the need of the world is the formation of an international community under the 
reign of law, or correctly, the formation of a world community under the reign of law, in which 
nationality or race should fi nd no place.36 
For the strict practice of international law, the establishment of “international society under a 
rule of law” was necessary. Pal strongly advocated the emergence of what he termed the “Super State,” 
which he believed would “eradicate wars and overcome racial discrimination.”37
Obviously he did not believe the idea of “the world commonwealth” would be embodied in im-
mediate future, he rather thought that the international social system ought to be transformed unconven-
tionally toward the ideal ”the world of commonwealth.” He regarded the fi rst step to “the world of com-
monwealth” as the establishment of an international agency with national sovereignty as its premise. He 
said that such an international agency was not yet fully established therefore the practice of international 
law faced serious diffi culties. In other words, without a Super State, there could exist no concrete and 
executive power, and whether international war would be executed or not would after all be determined 
by the international affairs and power relations of the time. This was the reason why he stressed the im-
portance of the early introduction and establishment of an international agency for the observance and 
execution of international law. And, he believed a “widening sense of humanity” to develop the inter-
36　The Research Committee on Tokyo Trial 1984a, p. 385.
37　Ibid., p. 289.
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national agency into the ideal “world commonwealth” would stabilize the order of international society.
Pal was a believer of humanism based on the philosophy of “dharma” from ancient India. He 
advocated Gandhism, and dreamt of the day that human beings would establish ideals based on the 
ultimate pacifi sm.
On his visit to Japan in 1952, Pal, asked to make speeches at different places in Japan, stressing 
that Japan should introduce unarmed neutralism in the world during the Cold War. Strongly opposed 
to Japan’s remilitarization corresponding to the will of the United States, he passionately advocated 
the teachings of Gandhism. Pal showed his resentment and disappointment to a Japan which had been 
strengthening its dependence on the United States, and he strongly criticized Japan as indifferent to the 
discussions in the Tokyo Tribunal and uncritically following the United States’ will.
It was when he visited the Atomic Bomb Memorial in Hiroshima that he clearly showed his bit-
terness toward Japan.
On seeing the memorial’s inscription, “Let all the souls here in peace. For we shall not repeat 
the evil,” Pal said as follows:
Obviously, the subject of ‘we’ is Japanese. I do not see clearly what ‘the evil’ means here. The 
souls being wished to rest here are the victims’ of the Atomic Bomb. It is clear to me that the 
bomb was not dropped by Japanese and the hands of bombers remain bloodstained. [...] If not re-
peating the mistakes means not possessing weapons in the future, I think that is a very exemplary 
decision. If Japan wishes to possess military power again, that would be a defi lement against the 
souls of the victims we have here in Hiroshima.38
His anger toward the mentality of Japanese people in the post-war era was expressed in his re-
mark. He condemned Japan’s remilitarization corresponding to the will of the United States, in light of 
the U.S. responsibility for the Atomic bombing of Japan.
5. Misappropriation of Pal’s Dissentient Judgment by Historical Revisionists
As explained in the introduction of this paper, Japanese post-war historical revisionists have 
ignored the kernel of Pal’s argument and his thoughts outlined above, and instead repeatedly evoked his 
judgment to support their positions. They have distorted some parts of Pal’s dissentient judgment and 
applied it to their right wing discourse, such as “Japan’s innocence” and “the affi rmative argument on 
the Great East War,” “criticism on the Tokyo Tribunal,” and “criticism on the masochistic view of his-
tory.” The serial arguments for example of Masaaki Tanaka, who advocates a reading of Pal’s arguments 
as “Japan is not guilty,” were especially infl uential and became a foundation for further misreadings of 
Pal which continue to the present.
38　The Chūgoku Shimbun, 4 November 1952.
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A writer and social activist, Tanaka was born in 1911, and developed his activities under the 
infl uence of ultra-nationalists such as Yasaburō Shimonaka and Takeyo Nakatani in the pre-war period. 
In 1933, Tanaka joined the newly-established Greater East Asia Association that had Iwane Matsui 
(who was later executed for a class-A war crimes) as chairman. Tanaka was involved in editing the or-
ganization’s paper, “Greater East Asianism.” Tanaka also served as Matsui’s secretary and was active as 
Matsui’s right arm until Matsui was appointed Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces sent 
to China in 1937.
In April 1952, soon after the lifting of media censorship by the U.S. occupation forces, Tanaka 
published On Japan’s Innocence: The Truth on Trial in which he inserted his interpretation of Pal’s dis-
sentient judgment. In his book, Tanaka quoted Pal’s arguments in a generally accurate way then added 
his commentary. For example, on the Nanjing Massacre, he faithfully quoted Pal’s opinion then said, “it 
is a plain fact that the Japanese military committed the atrocity.”39
However, it should be addressed that his book title is not appropriate. It obviously deviated from 
the purport of Pal’s argument. Firstly, since the object of Pal’s judgment was only “the criminal respon-
sibilities of class-A accused,” the object in the book title ought to be “On class-A Innocence.” It is also 
noted that Pal found criminal responsibility in the cases of class-B and -C accused of conventional war 
crimes. He did not discount all of Japan’s alleged criminal actions.
Secondly, the term “innocence” should be clarifi ed in that Pal found the Japanese accused “in-
nocent” only in terms of international law. As quoted in this paper earlier, Pal said, “Tōjō and his group 
might have done many wrong things,” and “The statesmen, diplomats and politicians of Japan were 
perhaps wrong, and perhaps they misled themselves,” and found moral responsibility in the Japanese 
leaders. Therefore it is not accurate to say that Pal found no responsibility with the Japanese leaders for 
the acts by the Japanese army, or that they had no moral responsibility. From these points, the title should 
have been “On Class-A War Criminals Innocence,” at the most.
Apart from the misleading title, I say the essential part of Pal’s argument was addressed gener-
ally accurately in Tanaka’s book. Although some problems are recognized, neither arbitrary deletions 
nor the interpretations by Tanaka were presented in his fi rst book.
However in Tanaka’s next book, Justice Pal’s Discussion on Japan as not Guilty, published in 
1963 (and the best selling book of the year), there are obvious misreadings, falsifi cations, phrases that 
induce readers’ misunderstanding, intentional omissions of or obvious deviations from Pal’s arguments.
For example, although in his dissentient judgment Pal said, “the hostility which commenced 
between China and Japan on 7th July 1937 cannot be denied the name of ‘war,’” and said that Japan’s 
acts after the Sino-Japanese War should be examined at the tribunal; Tanaka claimed in his book that 
it was said in Pal’s dissentient judgment that the scope of the tribunal ought to be limited to the period 
39　Tanaka 1952, p. 28.
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between December 7, 1941 and Japan’s surrender.40
This is an obvious misreading or a falsifi cation that seriously distorts Pal’s argument. Further-
more, Tanaka completely ignored Pal’s condemnation of the Chang Tso-lin Assassination Incident, the 
Manchuria Incident, and the establishment of Manchukuo. He also ignored the fact that Pal had con-
fi rmed the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s atrocities in the Philippines as facts and strongly criticized 
them. The sections in which Pal criticized these actions were among the most important in the develop-
ment of his argument. Therefore, omitting these severe criticisms of Japan’s actions, which Pal termed 
“devilish and fi endish,” is a serious problem.
It was at this time that Tanaka began presenting his argument denying the Nanjing Massacre. 
Tanaka later became a main polemicist of the massacre deniers in 1980. Because Justice Pal’s Discus-
sion on Japan as not Guilty had arbitrary interpretations, omissions and misreadings of Pal’s argument 
in favor of Tanaka’s political intentions, the book infl uenced similar arguments around Pal’s dissentient 
judgment.
In 1964, a year after the publication of Justice Pal’s Discussion on Japan as not Guilty, literature 
scholar Fusao Hayashi published his book Affi rming the Greater East Asia War, which was exposed to 
much criticism. Hayashi presented his view of “the one hundred years war of East Asia” in the book. 
Hayashi re-defi ned Japan’s period from the end of the Edo Era to the end of the Greater East Asia War 
as a “history of resistance” of Japan and Asian countries against Western Imperialism. Hayashi used a 
chapter of his book to introduce Pal’s Judgment with quotations from Tanaka’s Justice Pal’s Discussion 
on Japan as not Guilty. Hayashi closed the chapter as follows:
It is needless to talk about the Greater East Asia War again. Japan lost beautifully. Future histo-
rians would write and leave Japan’s gallant fi ght, its brave spirit and its fate as a heroic chapter 
of the 20th century.41
Quoting Tanaka’s commentary in Justice Pal’s Discussion on Japan as not Guilty, “As long as 
Japanese people are indoctrinated by the sense of guilt that ‘Japan was the country who carried out em-
barrassing aggressive wars to face the world,’ Japan will never have its true glory,” Hayashi discussed 
the value of Pal’s judgment to favor his thesis of the war as just. He especially highlighted Pal’s view 
on the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States to assert the Greater East Asia War as le-
gitimate.
Facing an onslaught of revisionist interpretations of Pal’s argument striving to justify the Greater 
East Asia War, it was historian Saburō Ienaga who responded. Ienaga published his paper, “The Fifteen-
year War and Pal’s Judgment,” in 1967. “Pal’s Judgment is being implemented as a perfect weapon to 
40　Tanaka 2001, p. 165.
41　Hayashi 2006 (1964), p. 341.
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strengthen a social atmosphere supporting the Greater East Asia War justifying theory which has be-
come increasingly dominant due the coordinated push of political power and civil forces,” wrote Ienaga 
in the paper, pointing out the inaccuracy of the term “Japan’s innocence” and criticizing the superfi cial 
and arbitrary use of Pal’s Judgment. He also said that the judgment was written based on anti-communist 
ideology and its argument was “full of extremely distorted views.”42 [This argument was responded to 
critically by Richard Minear, and Ienaga and Minear debated the issue.]
However, arguments that used Pal’s Judgment in support of the right wing’s discourse continued 
to appear, and this trend actually increased, especially from the late 1990s when Japan’s rightward drift 
became pronounced.
In 1997, a memorial monument to Judge Pal was erected at Kyoto Gokoku Shrine It was estab-
lished by the Committee for the Establishment of Judge Pal’s Memorial Monument; whose chairman 
was Ryūzō Sejima, a former Kwantung Army Staff Offi cer and former Supreme Adviser of Itochū Cor-
poration; and had Governor of Kyoto Teiichi Aranamaki and Kyoto City Mayor Yorikane Masumoto as 
members.
The establishment of the monument was followed by a similar monument at Yasukuni Shrine. 
Toshiaki Nambu, the shrine’s Chief Priest said at the unveiling ceremony, “It is my earnest wish that the 
drift of masochism will end, and the day when the spirits of war dead may rest in peace comes as early 
as possible.” In 2002 at Yūshūkan, a Japanese military and war museum within Yasukuni Shrine, Pal’s 
pictures and his remarks on his visit to Japan in 1952 were displayed in the context of criticizing “the 
view of the Tokyo Tribunal” and “masochistic view of history.” A 1998 movie titled “Pride—The Mo-
ment of Destiny,” directed by Shunya Itō, pushed criticism of the “unjust” Tokyo Tribunal to the fore-
front. By arbitrarily evoking Pal’s words and his dissentient judgment, the director presented a vision 
wherein Hideki Tōjō kept his pride. Fantasies and interpretations that were not based on historical truth 
were featured in the movie, and it became infl uential in developing right wing discourse in contempo-
rary Japanese society along with the enchantment of the movement of the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reform. Pal also appeared in the cartoon On War by Yoshinori Kobayashi in the same year. In 
the cartoon, Pal’s argument was quoted in the context of justifying Japan’s Greater East Asia War. For 
example, Kobayashi drew a balloon from the cartoon of Pal’s face, which said, “All defendants are not 
guilty!” and included commentary as follows:
In the war / the United States / had absolutely no justice /Japan / had justice / of self-defense / 
furthermore of protecting the whole of Asia from the Western powers!
While the author of this paper does not examine the legitimacy of Kobayashi’s argument here, 
his use of Pal’s argument above was inaccurate. Kobayashi, though, continued to develop his position. 
42　Ienaga 1973, p. 23–43.
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In 2008, he published The True Arguments of Pal. In this cartoon, he put his criticism to the earlier-
mentioned author’s book Judge Pal: Criticism of the Tokyo Trial and Absolute Pacifi sm as an axis for 
his coercive implementation of Pal’s judgment as meaning “Japan was not guilty.”
As explained, Pal’s judgment has been evoked in Japanese historical revisionists’ discourse to 
justify the Great East War or to discredit the Tokyo Tribunal. Pal’s position has been employed in at-
tempts to give legitimacy to the history view of Japanese right-wingers beyond Pal’s true thinking and 
intention.
The author explained the philosophy of Judge Pal as well as how Pal’s opinions came to be 
misinterpreted and continue to be used with misleading readings.
The revisionists ignore the fact that Pal critically assessed Japan’s invasions of Asia after the 
Manchurian Incident. They deliberately close their eyes to Pal’s severe condemnation of Japan’s war 
crimes. They, furthermore, do not mention Pal’s passionate call for the establishment of an international 
agency, unarmed neutrality, and his opposition to Japan’s remilitarization, and keep stretching selected 
elements of Pal’s judgment to strengthen their discourse.
The crucial matter now is freeing Pal’s dissentient judgment from the false framework built by 
the right wing, and reexamining its position academically. This effort will directly connect to building a 
platform for the people who oppose the promotion of baseless historical revisionism and the pervading 
rightward tilt in contemporary Japan.
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